a Response to The Modal Ontological Argument, an Explanatory Symmetry Breaker

One of my favorite philosophical arguments, the Modal Ontological Argument, championed by my favorite philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, has been given some attention recently, by the likes of Joe Schmid (of Majesty of Reason fame) and Dr. Joshua Rasmussen, two philosophers whom I admire greatly. Schmid and Rasmussen have, on separate occasions, frequently discussed ways that the symmetry of the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA) and the Reverse Modal Ontological Argument (RMOA) may be broken, an exciting possibility (no modal pun intended).

For those unfamiliar with the MOA or Ontological Arguments in general, I highly recommend reading Plantinga’s book, “the Nature of Necessity,” (where the MOA originated) as well as Graham Oppy’s book, “Ontological Arguments and Belief in God.” However, I will also briefly summarize the MOA, and try to provide some background on the state of Ontological Arguments in contemporary philosophy of religion.

The MOA deals with modal logic, and metaphysical possibility. It is very important to clarify that we are not dealing with epistemic possibility or logical possibility. Furthermore, it is important to clarify the definition of God used in the MOA. Firstly, we need to clarify some definitions. “Maximal excellence” is omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection. So, if a being has maximal excellence, that being has those stated attributes. Furthermore, “maximal greatness” is maximal excellence in every possible world, or necessary existence and necessary maximal excellence. So, if a being is maximally great, that being has the traits of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection necessarily, and that being also exists necessarily. In the MOA, God is defined as a “maximally great being,” and thus exists necessarily, and has all the aforementioned attributes of maximal excellence necessarily. With these preliminary definitions out of the way, Plantinga’s MOA goes as follows:

1. It is metaphysically possible that a God (a maximally great being) exists.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) exists.

Indeed, for those unfamiliar with metaphysical possibility and necessity and the philosophy behind modal logic, this argument seems strange, and perhaps even simply invalid. But perhaps by rephrasing the first premise more precisely the idea of the argument can be made clear:

1. There is a possible world in which God (a maximally great being) exists.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) exists.

The validity of the argument comes is mathematically sound, based on the principles of S5 modal logic, but the argument can be understood to be valid intuitively just by understanding what the first premise is stating. If God exists in a possible world, God would (by definition) exist in all possible worlds (since God, in addition to being maximally excellent, exists necessarily). So, it is clear that, in the MOA’s definition of God, God either exists in all possible worlds, or no possible worlds (not all theists view God as a “necessary being” in the way that God is defined in the MOA. Richard Swinburne, for example, rejects this view. However, in the context of the argument, God is a “necessary being,” and this view of God is uncontroversial.

Now that the first premise has been clarified and the unquestionable validity of the argument has been confirmed, we can see that the entire argument hinges on the first premise, which in itself is making a strange statement that is by no means self-evident or even reasonable for those who don’t already accept the conclusion. To say that God exists in a possible world is to say that there is a complete and consistent way the world could have been such that God would have existed and given God’s property of necessary existence (as given by proponents of the MOA), we really have no reason to accept this first premise unless we already believe that the conclusion is true. In fact, there doesn’t even seem to be a way to make progress in furthering the plausibility of the first premise alone, as it seems to be undeniably attached to the conclusion. Thus, it doesn’t seem clear to me at all that the first premise is even more modest of a statement than the conclusion, given God’s property of necessary existence it directly entails the conclusion (as previously clarified), so the argument almost seems to be a complete non-starter.

To further clarify the seeming ineffectiveness of the MOA, philosophers have constructed the “Reverse Modal Ontological Argument” (RMOA), which is more or less exactly what it sounds like:

1. It is metaphysically possible that a God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

Or,

1. There is a possible world in which God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

Like the original MOA, the RMOA is unquestionably valid, for if God (as defined in the MOA) does not exist in a possible world, God does not exist in any possible world, including the actual world. There seems to be no reason that one should be inclined towards one statement (“It is metaphysically possible that God exists” vs. “It is metaphysically possible that God does not exist”) a priori, and thus there appears to be an undeniable symmetry to the MOA and the RMOA that prevents us from making further progress.

Ok, that was not much of a “brief summary,” but I don’t believe we should be brief in talking about these arguments, since precision is absolutely key given the potential semantic slipups that people often make when discussing these arguments that can lead to dramatic conclusions and misinterpretations. 

Now onto the symmetry breaker. More precisely, this is an “explanatory” symmetry breaker, that makes use of components from contingency arguments, more specifically a weak explanatory principle, which guides conclusion that we should favor the MOA’s first premise over the RMOA’s first premise. I will present some preliminary definitions, share some notes on the explanatory principle and some brief arguments for why we should accept the principle, share some further definitions, and then present the Symmetry Breaker itself. (Note: this entire argument and its background is derived from Joe Schmid’s discussion with Alex O’Connor which took place on the Capturing Christianity YouTube channel, I’ve just essentially organized Joe’s thoughts on the argument and laid out a syllogism as best I could, the credit goes to him for actually creating this particular syllogism of course).

Preliminary Definitions:

Concrete thing: Any entity that has causal power.

Existential fact: A true proposition about the existence of a concrete thing.

Principle of Explanation (PE), formal definition: All else being equal, every existential fact is explained by some other fact which includes the existence of some concrete thing that is not among the concrete things specified in the existential fact being explained.

Principle of Explanation (PE), informal definition: All else being equal, existential facts have an outside explanation.

Notes on PE:

PE does not demand or require an explanation for existential facts, rather it says that an explanation exists all else being equal. In other words, there is a defeasible presumption in favor of there being an explanation. We should expect an explanation unless we have a positive reason to think that there is no such explanation. Absent some positive reason to think otherwise, we are justified in taking there to be an explanation.

PE is only concerned with external, or non-circular explanations (that is to say, explanations that don’t presuppose the very thing being explained).

An explanation of an existential fact itself includes a concrete thing, and an explanatory activity (the grounding activity, causing activity, functional realizing activity, etc.) of the concrete thing.

A brief argument for the plausibility of PE:

PE seems intuitive in its own right, as things generally seem to have explanations; it seems strange to imagine concrete things (like turtles) having no explanations for their existence. Moreover, PE seems to track both philosophical and scientific practice. Even when we don’t have an explanation readily available, philosophers and scientists generally readily take it to that there is an explanation, even when it is yet undiscovered. PE also enjoys abundant inductive and experiential support. In our experience, existential facts (more or less) always have outside explanations in terms of facts that cite concrete things that brought them about or that account for them. Plausibly, PE best explains the uniform and widespread inductive support that we have for it.

Further definitions:

PPE (more formal definition): Every existential fact is possibly explained by another fact that includes the existence of something that is not among the things in the fact being explained.

PPE (informal definition): Existential facts possibly have an explanation, all else being equal.

Imperfect Fact: An existential fact that is stated as follows: “there are imperfect beings.”

The Symmetry Breaker:

1. PPE is true.

2. Imperfect Fact is an existential fact.

So,

3. All else equal, Imperfect Fact is possibly explained.

And, 

4. Possibly, the explanation for Imperfect Fact includes a concrete thing “T,” that is not among the entities in Imperfect Fact.

So,

5. Possibly, T, a being that is not among the imperfect beings (and thus is perfect), exists.

Conclusion:

6. Possibly, a perfect being exists.

And the conclusion is, of course, the first premise of the original MOA, for a perfect being is precisely what a maximally great being is, and thus a perfect being has the property of (metaphysically) necessary existence, leading us to the conclusion that a perfect being exists in the actual world, so a perfect being exists.

I will raise two main objections to this argument, one raising criticisms against PPE, and the other raising criticisms against Imperfect Fact.

Objection 1: On PPE

Before I attempt to take a critical look at PPE, it is important to first deal with the kinds of facts (in terms of how they are explained), and there are three possibilities: a fact is either contingent (explained by another), necessary (explained by itself, or more precisely, true in every possible world), or brute (unexplained). PE (the original principle from which PPE is derived, so I’ll start by discussing PE) proposes that, given an existential fact, we ought to consider that fact contingent unless we have positive reason to think otherwise. If we want to exhaust all possibilities, a given existential fact could be either contingent, necessary, or brute. Given that we have three options that a given existential fact could match, it is not entirely clear that we should simply defer towards a given existential fact being contingent given that we have two other (apparently) perfect good options. Perhaps one could make an argument that we should defer towards considering an existential fact to be non-brute, that is, unexplained. This would simply be defending a rather standard form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). But importantly, this is not what PE is stating. PE is stating that we should consider that a given existential fact is a contingent fact unless we have positive reasons to consider otherwise. So, PE goes farther than just the standard PSR, since PE rejects that we should consider a given existential fact may be contingent or necessary.

Even if we grant some form of the PSR (that is to say, we reject there being brute facts that have no explanation), this does not get us to PE. If the entity described by a given existential fact could have failed to exist, then we should consider the existential fact a contingent fact. But, if the entity described by a given existential fact could not have failed to exist, the existential fact is a necessary fact. Now PE does not claim that all existential facts are contingent (such a claim could run into serious problems), but merely states that we should defer towards contingency given an existential fact. But this does not seem quite right. Why defer towards any particular status without a positive reason? If one believes that we should consider the metaphysical status of a given existential fact unknown absent of any positive reasons, then one has adequate grounds for rejecting PE, and the symmetry breaker fails.

I will now raise a second objection, but this time towards PPE in specific. Before I raise the objection, I will posit a principle that is crucial for my objection. I will call this the principle of necessary metaphysical status. I’m sure it has been discussed before (probably multiple times), but I haven’t heard it mentioned anywhere so I’ll just present it as I have thought it up. The principle goes as follows: for a given fact, whatever the metaphysical status of the fact is (necessary, contingent, brute), the fact holds its metaphysical status necessarily. So, a necessary fact is necessarily necessary, a contingent fact is necessarily contingent, and a brute fact is necessarily brute. All this principle is really saying is that the metaphysical status of a given fact cannot vary in possible worlds. If a fact is contingent, it cannot be necessary nor brute in another possible world, and same is true with necessary and brute facts. Given this principle, I will present a following argument:

1. Principle of necessary metaphysical status is true (whatever is necessary/contingent/brute is such necessarily).

2. Existential fact x is possibly contingent.

3. If existential fact x is possibly contingent, then existential fact is necessarily contingent (from P1, S5).

4. If existential fact x is necessarily contingent, then existential fact x is actually contingent.

5. Existential fact x is actually contingent (from P2, P3, P4).

In other words, this argument demonstrates that, given the principle of necessary metaphysical status, if a fact is possibly contingent, it is actually contingent. This argument makes use of S5 modal logic, similar to the original MOA.

What does this conclusion demonstrate, exactly? This conclusion demonstrates that PPE is not more modest than PE, rather that PE is in fact entailed by PPE. For, if a fact is possibly contingent, then that fact is actually contingent, given the principle of necessary metaphysical status. So, as it turns out, PPE is and PE are simply of equal modesty, as given one, the other is true. And, when you run the argument with PE, it simply turns into a defeasible contingent argument. So, it turns out that the argument seems to boil down to the effectiveness of PE, against which I have argued in my first objection.

Objection 2: On Imperfect Fact

My second main categorical objection is perhaps not so much of an objection as it is general confusion over the ambiguity of the existential fact, Imperfect Fact. I will argue that some interpretations of Imperfect Fact lead to some very strange conclusion and that the argument suffers as a conclusion, so this objection is essentially a request for clarification/precision with regards to Imperfect Fact.

Put quite simply, Imperfect Fact is stated as follows: “there are imperfect beings.” Now, what exactly is the property of imperfection? At first glance, it seems that it is not actually a positive property in itself, but rather the lack of a property, namely the lack of the property perfection. If this is indeed the case, we can make some bizarre parodies using lack of properties. For example, consider the existential fact, “non-brown-haired beings exist,” which refers to the existence of beings which lack the property of being brown-haired. If we apply PE to this existential fact, and the fact is indeed contingent, then the existence of non-brown-haired beings is explained by external concrete beings not among the beings in the fact, so brown-haired beings. Thus, we have reached the conclusion that the existence of non-brown-haired beings is explained by some causal activity from brown-haired beings. This conclusion seems nonsensical, and the reason is the description of the beings in the existential fact being regarded as lacking some property. This parody can be done to many other properties as well which reach absurd conclusions.

Thus, if Imperfect Fact is using imperfection to mean a lack of the property perfection, we have good reason to reject the argument, as it is open to absurd parodies. I am of course aware that this may very well not be what Imperfect Fact is stating, but if that is the case then I simply request further clarification in what exactly we are talking about when we reference imperfect beings.

Conclusion:

As I have previously stated, I find the original MOA unsuccessful as an argument for the existence of God for the reasons previously stated, most notably the symmetry that appears with the RMOA, but also more generally because the possibility premise is no more modest nor easy to motivate than the conclusion itself.

Furthermore, I believe the Explanatory Symmetry Breaker presented by Joe Schmid (and also by Dr. Rasmussen in the past) is a better attempt at motivating the first premise of the MOA. That being said, I do think that it is unsuccessful, for the reasons that my objections state (mainly that I do not think that we should accept PE, and that PPE is no more modest a principle).

In his discussion with Alex O’Connor, Schmid mentioned that he has written a paper on the Symmetry Breaker. While I would love to read the paper (as Schmid’s work tends to be top-notch in my opinion) and will read it when it is available, at the time I have written this the paper is not yet published, and thus I have not been able to read Schmid’s most articulated defense of the argument. All of my critiques are aimed against what he has presented in his videos. It is possible that he has addressed my criticisms in the paper, but until that is released to the public I do not believe my objections have been satisfyingly addressed by Schmid, and thus I do not believe the Explanatory Symmetry Breaker is successful.