a Response to The Modal Ontological Argument, an Explanatory Symmetry Breaker

One of my favorite philosophical arguments, the Modal Ontological Argument, championed by my favorite philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, has been given some attention recently, by the likes of Joe Schmid (of Majesty of Reason fame) and Dr. Joshua Rasmussen, two philosophers whom I admire greatly. Schmid and Rasmussen have, on separate occasions, frequently discussed ways that the symmetry of the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA) and the Reverse Modal Ontological Argument (RMOA) may be broken, an exciting possibility (no modal pun intended).

For those unfamiliar with the MOA or Ontological Arguments in general, I highly recommend reading Plantinga’s book, “the Nature of Necessity,” (where the MOA originated) as well as Graham Oppy’s book, “Ontological Arguments and Belief in God.” However, I will also briefly summarize the MOA, and try to provide some background on the state of Ontological Arguments in contemporary philosophy of religion.

The MOA deals with modal logic, and metaphysical possibility. It is very important to clarify that we are not dealing with epistemic possibility or logical possibility. Furthermore, it is important to clarify the definition of God used in the MOA. Firstly, we need to clarify some definitions. “Maximal excellence” is omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection. So, if a being has maximal excellence, that being has those stated attributes. Furthermore, “maximal greatness” is maximal excellence in every possible world, or necessary existence and necessary maximal excellence. So, if a being is maximally great, that being has the traits of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection necessarily, and that being also exists necessarily. In the MOA, God is defined as a “maximally great being,” and thus exists necessarily, and has all the aforementioned attributes of maximal excellence necessarily. With these preliminary definitions out of the way, Plantinga’s MOA goes as follows:

1. It is metaphysically possible that a God (a maximally great being) exists.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) exists.

Indeed, for those unfamiliar with metaphysical possibility and necessity and the philosophy behind modal logic, this argument seems strange, and perhaps even simply invalid. But perhaps by rephrasing the first premise more precisely the idea of the argument can be made clear:

1. There is a possible world in which God (a maximally great being) exists.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) exists.

The validity of the argument comes is mathematically sound, based on the principles of S5 modal logic, but the argument can be understood to be valid intuitively just by understanding what the first premise is stating. If God exists in a possible world, God would (by definition) exist in all possible worlds (since God, in addition to being maximally excellent, exists necessarily). So, it is clear that, in the MOA’s definition of God, God either exists in all possible worlds, or no possible worlds (not all theists view God as a “necessary being” in the way that God is defined in the MOA. Richard Swinburne, for example, rejects this view. However, in the context of the argument, God is a “necessary being,” and this view of God is uncontroversial.

Now that the first premise has been clarified and the unquestionable validity of the argument has been confirmed, we can see that the entire argument hinges on the first premise, which in itself is making a strange statement that is by no means self-evident or even reasonable for those who don’t already accept the conclusion. To say that God exists in a possible world is to say that there is a complete and consistent way the world could have been such that God would have existed and given God’s property of necessary existence (as given by proponents of the MOA), we really have no reason to accept this first premise unless we already believe that the conclusion is true. In fact, there doesn’t even seem to be a way to make progress in furthering the plausibility of the first premise alone, as it seems to be undeniably attached to the conclusion. Thus, it doesn’t seem clear to me at all that the first premise is even more modest of a statement than the conclusion, given God’s property of necessary existence it directly entails the conclusion (as previously clarified), so the argument almost seems to be a complete non-starter.

To further clarify the seeming ineffectiveness of the MOA, philosophers have constructed the “Reverse Modal Ontological Argument” (RMOA), which is more or less exactly what it sounds like:

1. It is metaphysically possible that a God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

Or,

1. There is a possible world in which God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

So,

2. God (a maximally great being) does not exist.

Like the original MOA, the RMOA is unquestionably valid, for if God (as defined in the MOA) does not exist in a possible world, God does not exist in any possible world, including the actual world. There seems to be no reason that one should be inclined towards one statement (“It is metaphysically possible that God exists” vs. “It is metaphysically possible that God does not exist”) a priori, and thus there appears to be an undeniable symmetry to the MOA and the RMOA that prevents us from making further progress.

Ok, that was not much of a “brief summary,” but I don’t believe we should be brief in talking about these arguments, since precision is absolutely key given the potential semantic slipups that people often make when discussing these arguments that can lead to dramatic conclusions and misinterpretations. 

Now onto the symmetry breaker. More precisely, this is an “explanatory” symmetry breaker, that makes use of components from contingency arguments, more specifically a weak explanatory principle, which guides conclusion that we should favor the MOA’s first premise over the RMOA’s first premise. I will present some preliminary definitions, share some notes on the explanatory principle and some brief arguments for why we should accept the principle, share some further definitions, and then present the Symmetry Breaker itself. (Note: this entire argument and its background is derived from Joe Schmid’s discussion with Alex O’Connor which took place on the Capturing Christianity YouTube channel, I’ve just essentially organized Joe’s thoughts on the argument and laid out a syllogism as best I could, the credit goes to him for actually creating this particular syllogism of course).

Preliminary Definitions:

Concrete thing: Any entity that has causal power.

Existential fact: A true proposition about the existence of a concrete thing.

Principle of Explanation (PE), formal definition: All else being equal, every existential fact is explained by some other fact which includes the existence of some concrete thing that is not among the concrete things specified in the existential fact being explained.

Principle of Explanation (PE), informal definition: All else being equal, existential facts have an outside explanation.

Notes on PE:

PE does not demand or require an explanation for existential facts, rather it says that an explanation exists all else being equal. In other words, there is a defeasible presumption in favor of there being an explanation. We should expect an explanation unless we have a positive reason to think that there is no such explanation. Absent some positive reason to think otherwise, we are justified in taking there to be an explanation.

PE is only concerned with external, or non-circular explanations (that is to say, explanations that don’t presuppose the very thing being explained).

An explanation of an existential fact itself includes a concrete thing, and an explanatory activity (the grounding activity, causing activity, functional realizing activity, etc.) of the concrete thing.

A brief argument for the plausibility of PE:

PE seems intuitive in its own right, as things generally seem to have explanations; it seems strange to imagine concrete things (like turtles) having no explanations for their existence. Moreover, PE seems to track both philosophical and scientific practice. Even when we don’t have an explanation readily available, philosophers and scientists generally readily take it to that there is an explanation, even when it is yet undiscovered. PE also enjoys abundant inductive and experiential support. In our experience, existential facts (more or less) always have outside explanations in terms of facts that cite concrete things that brought them about or that account for them. Plausibly, PE best explains the uniform and widespread inductive support that we have for it.

Further definitions:

PPE (more formal definition): Every existential fact is possibly explained by another fact that includes the existence of something that is not among the things in the fact being explained.

PPE (informal definition): Existential facts possibly have an explanation, all else being equal.

Imperfect Fact: An existential fact that is stated as follows: “there are imperfect beings.”

The Symmetry Breaker:

1. PPE is true.

2. Imperfect Fact is an existential fact.

So,

3. All else equal, Imperfect Fact is possibly explained.

And, 

4. Possibly, the explanation for Imperfect Fact includes a concrete thing “T,” that is not among the entities in Imperfect Fact.

So,

5. Possibly, T, a being that is not among the imperfect beings (and thus is perfect), exists.

Conclusion:

6. Possibly, a perfect being exists.

And the conclusion is, of course, the first premise of the original MOA, for a perfect being is precisely what a maximally great being is, and thus a perfect being has the property of (metaphysically) necessary existence, leading us to the conclusion that a perfect being exists in the actual world, so a perfect being exists.

I will raise two main objections to this argument, one raising criticisms against PPE, and the other raising criticisms against Imperfect Fact.

Objection 1: On PPE

Before I attempt to take a critical look at PPE, it is important to first deal with the kinds of facts (in terms of how they are explained), and there are three possibilities: a fact is either contingent (explained by another), necessary (explained by itself, or more precisely, true in every possible world), or brute (unexplained). PE (the original principle from which PPE is derived, so I’ll start by discussing PE) proposes that, given an existential fact, we ought to consider that fact contingent unless we have positive reason to think otherwise. If we want to exhaust all possibilities, a given existential fact could be either contingent, necessary, or brute. Given that we have three options that a given existential fact could match, it is not entirely clear that we should simply defer towards a given existential fact being contingent given that we have two other (apparently) perfect good options. Perhaps one could make an argument that we should defer towards considering an existential fact to be non-brute, that is, unexplained. This would simply be defending a rather standard form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). But importantly, this is not what PE is stating. PE is stating that we should consider that a given existential fact is a contingent fact unless we have positive reasons to consider otherwise. So, PE goes farther than just the standard PSR, since PE rejects that we should consider a given existential fact may be contingent or necessary.

Even if we grant some form of the PSR (that is to say, we reject there being brute facts that have no explanation), this does not get us to PE. If the entity described by a given existential fact could have failed to exist, then we should consider the existential fact a contingent fact. But, if the entity described by a given existential fact could not have failed to exist, the existential fact is a necessary fact. Now PE does not claim that all existential facts are contingent (such a claim could run into serious problems), but merely states that we should defer towards contingency given an existential fact. But this does not seem quite right. Why defer towards any particular status without a positive reason? If one believes that we should consider the metaphysical status of a given existential fact unknown absent of any positive reasons, then one has adequate grounds for rejecting PE, and the symmetry breaker fails.

I will now raise a second objection, but this time towards PPE in specific. Before I raise the objection, I will posit a principle that is crucial for my objection. I will call this the principle of necessary metaphysical status. I’m sure it has been discussed before (probably multiple times), but I haven’t heard it mentioned anywhere so I’ll just present it as I have thought it up. The principle goes as follows: for a given fact, whatever the metaphysical status of the fact is (necessary, contingent, brute), the fact holds its metaphysical status necessarily. So, a necessary fact is necessarily necessary, a contingent fact is necessarily contingent, and a brute fact is necessarily brute. All this principle is really saying is that the metaphysical status of a given fact cannot vary in possible worlds. If a fact is contingent, it cannot be necessary nor brute in another possible world, and same is true with necessary and brute facts. Given this principle, I will present a following argument:

1. Principle of necessary metaphysical status is true (whatever is necessary/contingent/brute is such necessarily).

2. Existential fact x is possibly contingent.

3. If existential fact x is possibly contingent, then existential fact is necessarily contingent (from P1, S5).

4. If existential fact x is necessarily contingent, then existential fact x is actually contingent.

5. Existential fact x is actually contingent (from P2, P3, P4).

In other words, this argument demonstrates that, given the principle of necessary metaphysical status, if a fact is possibly contingent, it is actually contingent. This argument makes use of S5 modal logic, similar to the original MOA.

What does this conclusion demonstrate, exactly? This conclusion demonstrates that PPE is not more modest than PE, rather that PE is in fact entailed by PPE. For, if a fact is possibly contingent, then that fact is actually contingent, given the principle of necessary metaphysical status. So, as it turns out, PPE is and PE are simply of equal modesty, as given one, the other is true. And, when you run the argument with PE, it simply turns into a defeasible contingent argument. So, it turns out that the argument seems to boil down to the effectiveness of PE, against which I have argued in my first objection.

Objection 2: On Imperfect Fact

My second main categorical objection is perhaps not so much of an objection as it is general confusion over the ambiguity of the existential fact, Imperfect Fact. I will argue that some interpretations of Imperfect Fact lead to some very strange conclusion and that the argument suffers as a conclusion, so this objection is essentially a request for clarification/precision with regards to Imperfect Fact.

Put quite simply, Imperfect Fact is stated as follows: “there are imperfect beings.” Now, what exactly is the property of imperfection? At first glance, it seems that it is not actually a positive property in itself, but rather the lack of a property, namely the lack of the property perfection. If this is indeed the case, we can make some bizarre parodies using lack of properties. For example, consider the existential fact, “non-brown-haired beings exist,” which refers to the existence of beings which lack the property of being brown-haired. If we apply PE to this existential fact, and the fact is indeed contingent, then the existence of non-brown-haired beings is explained by external concrete beings not among the beings in the fact, so brown-haired beings. Thus, we have reached the conclusion that the existence of non-brown-haired beings is explained by some causal activity from brown-haired beings. This conclusion seems nonsensical, and the reason is the description of the beings in the existential fact being regarded as lacking some property. This parody can be done to many other properties as well which reach absurd conclusions.

Thus, if Imperfect Fact is using imperfection to mean a lack of the property perfection, we have good reason to reject the argument, as it is open to absurd parodies. I am of course aware that this may very well not be what Imperfect Fact is stating, but if that is the case then I simply request further clarification in what exactly we are talking about when we reference imperfect beings.

Conclusion:

As I have previously stated, I find the original MOA unsuccessful as an argument for the existence of God for the reasons previously stated, most notably the symmetry that appears with the RMOA, but also more generally because the possibility premise is no more modest nor easy to motivate than the conclusion itself.

Furthermore, I believe the Explanatory Symmetry Breaker presented by Joe Schmid (and also by Dr. Rasmussen in the past) is a better attempt at motivating the first premise of the MOA. That being said, I do think that it is unsuccessful, for the reasons that my objections state (mainly that I do not think that we should accept PE, and that PPE is no more modest a principle).

In his discussion with Alex O’Connor, Schmid mentioned that he has written a paper on the Symmetry Breaker. While I would love to read the paper (as Schmid’s work tends to be top-notch in my opinion) and will read it when it is available, at the time I have written this the paper is not yet published, and thus I have not been able to read Schmid’s most articulated defense of the argument. All of my critiques are aimed against what he has presented in his videos. It is possible that he has addressed my criticisms in the paper, but until that is released to the public I do not believe my objections have been satisfyingly addressed by Schmid, and thus I do not believe the Explanatory Symmetry Breaker is successful.

a Response to Pavelich's “The Moral Problem with the Free Will Defense Against the Problem of Evil”

In Andrew Pavelich’s 2017 paper, “The Moral Problem with the Free Will Defense Against the Problem of Evil,” he outlines several criticisms of Plantinga’s “Free Will Defense” (FWD) against J.L. Mackie’s Problem of Evil (PoE).

I enjoyed the read, but disagree quite a bit with Pavelich. I personally don’t find Mackie’s PoE to be very convincing largely because of Plantinga’s work and some of my own reasoning. I (as I’ve previously stated) find arguments from natural evil/suffering far more effective, precisely because of their avoidance of the FWD.

In his paper, Pavelich critiques several facets of the FWD, but I’ll mainly be focusing on III. (Mitigation by Heaven and Hell) which I personally find decidedly weak. The reason I’m focusing on passage III is because I believe the FWD heavily hinges on some sort of afterlife, and because the conversation which opened my eyes to this paper largely stemmed around the importance of the afterlife for the FWD.

For some background, my general view is that plausibly, God would create a world with limited, contingent creatures operating under their own free will. Because these creatures are able to make their own choices and are limited in intellect and moral goodness (due to their contingent, non-divine nature), they are able to commit evils and cause harm and chaos. Once creatures die, there is some sort of afterlife where the wicked are punished, and the merciful are rewarded. I’m not entirely sure what specific afterlife view I’d like to commit myself to, but for PoE responses I’m not sure the specifics matter too much.

I agree that if all that there is is the life we have and the Earth that we inhabit, this would be strange for a perfect creator, because the costs of free will would be quite high with limited benefits, and the scale of justice could plausibly be quite skewed. This is why I hold the afterlife view to be so crucial to the FWD. It’s a game changer. Yes, in this life the world is plagued with many moral evils as a result of humanity’s actions (in addition to the moral goods, of course), but the theistic view seems far more plausible when there is some sort of afterlife where evildoers are punished and the benevolent are rewarded, for it is in the afterlife where the scales are ultimately tipped towards justice. This view to me seems quite strong in response to PoE based on purely human evils (natural evils are, of course, an entirely different matter, as I have previously mentioned). 

Pavelich begins section III with a brief overview of the involvement of Heaven and Hell in the FWD. Pavelich then argues that such a reward system is, at the very least, intuitively wrong when compared with a more everyday analogy. Pavelich then brings up an example where a parent fails to intervene when their child brutally attacks their other child. In this analogy, many years later, after the parent’s death, they leave the beaten child with their entire estate, and the attacker with nothing. Pavelich’s point, as he states, is that “overall we must acknowledge that morality is more than just punishment and compensation; it really does require action in the moment. Punishment or compensation after the fact only make moral sense if the original actions really should have been prevented” (Pavelich 4).

Pavelich admits this appeal is purely intuitive, but he holds that it is a common intuition nonetheless. But it seems to me that Pavelich may be mistaking the nature of punishment, especially in the context of the afterlife, which differs greatly from that used in everyday human life.

First of all, Pavelich argues that it seems to defeat the purpose of punishment when it is not in a form of deterrent, in which case it is most effective immediately after the act and publicly, in order to deter further evils. Now B.F. Skinner would certainly agree, but I’m not certain that punishment in the afterlife is exactly of this type of nature. Instead of being some sort of an everyday practical deterrent of future evils, punishment in the afterlife is rather an ultimate act of justice (or a “balancing of the scales”), where someone is judged based off of their cumulative actions (and nature) from their entire life, by an all-knowing, perfectly-just being.

This seems quite plausible, that such a system would be far more just. People will not be judged on one action, but will have an entire life of actions, thoughts, and beliefs. It is on this basis that God would judge, not necessarily on a case-by-case basis, immediately after the fact and in a public setting.

Pavelich then finishes section III by criticizing the aim of appeals to the afterlife: “to say that God makes up for it in the afterlife is not to give a response to the problem of evil; it is a way of mitigating evil once an answer is given” (Pavelich 5). I suppose I agree with this conclusion, though I find it somewhat strange. Is this a criticism of the appeal? The FWD defense is the direct answer, and the afterlife is a crucial component to that answer. Perhaps it isn’t the main component, but it is one that is doubtlessly crucial, and (in my opinion) is a cherry-on-top of sorts to the defense, that a perfectly just God would rectify the evils that result from free choices and would reward the good.

a Response to the Argument from Imperfection

One of my favorite philosophical atheists on twitter, Ben Watkins, has recently posted several intriguing arguments for atheism. Ben is a super intelligent guy and very charitable as well. He is a part of the Real Atheology team and bears influence from several of the all-time greats such as Oppy, Draper, and Mackie. Each argument is quite concise and compelling, and one of them piqued my interest in particular (and has provoked fascinating responses thus far), so I thought I’d give a response and articulate some of my thoughts about the argument.

Just for a quick disclaimer, I am very much a layman when it comes to philosophy of religion, and I may be mistaken in many of my views. This article is a personal analysis of the argument, and I am not attempting to “debunk” or decisively defeat anything. I will instead offer my personal thoughts as to some strengths and challenges of the argument as best I can, and hopefully will inspire further conversation.

The “Argument from Imperfection” is stated as follows:

A) A perfect creator can't create anything less than a perfect world 

B) The world is imperfect 

Therefore, 

C) The world was not created by a perfect creator 

D) Theism implies the world was created by a perfect creator 

Therefore, 

E) Theism is false

Randal Rauser pointed out that premise D can be tightened by instead stating “perfect being theism implies…” as opposed to just “theism implies.” I won’t quarrel too much over the language, but throughout this article I’ll be referring to strictly perfect being theism, as that is the primary philosophy against which the argument is arguing.

The argument is valid, of course, with the conclusions C, D, and E following from the premises A and B. So, as long as those first two premises are sound, the conclusion E (perfect being theism is false) does indeed logically follow. Therefore, the proponent of perfect being theism must argue against the soundness of at least one of the first two premises in order to avoid the conclusion. I’ll go over each premise individually.

Premise A)

Premise A posits that “a perfect creator can’t create anything less than a perfect world.” This is (in my opinion) the more controversial premise. I’m going to attempt to undercut the premise and argue that it lacks sufficient support. 

    First, it may be tempting to tentatively accept the premise just based off intuition. After all, how could a creator truly be perfect if its creations are themselves imperfect (let alone filled with seemingly gratuitous suffering and natural evils)? However, I’d like to pose a hypothetical argument to put our intuitions to question here:

The Hypothetical “Imperfect Creations” Argument

A) (Under perfect being theism), creations of a perfect being must also be perfect

B) (Under perfect being theism), human beings are creations of a perfect being 

C) Some human beings are imperfect 

Therefore, 

D) Perfect being theism is false

This argument (apart from premise A, of course) seems far more modest than the Argument from Imperfection. After all, it only posits that ‘some’ human beings are imperfect, which is practically impossible to deny, especially given the intensely morality-based nature of (more or less) all perfect being theism-based belief. Perhaps premise B could plausibly be denied, and I’d be interested to hear an argument against B, but it (at least at first glance) to me appears quite sound. At the very least, living creatures are a part of all creation, and thus they are themselves created as a result of the action of the perfect being. If premises B and C are sound, as well as premise A, it seems that this argument would be a far stronger and more modest form of the Argument from Imperfection. After all, the premise “some human beings are imperfect” appears far more modest than “the world is imperfect,” which makes a far grander statement involving knowledge of which we are not entirely certain.

But the hypothetical argument is quite flawed. The problems stem from the key premise A, which represents the intuitive thought that creations of a perfect being must also be perfect. We can plausibly conceive of a perfect being creating imperfect things, such as humans, for several reasons. The main reason would be that a perfect being would plausibly seek to create beings that are in control of their own free will, and thus are able to commit moral evils and contribute to imperfection through their own free choice. This wouldn’t be the fault of the perfect being, since plausibly it was most morally good for the perfect being to allow creatures control over their own actions and choices. Since we can certainly reason that a perfect being can in fact create imperfect beings, premise A (and thus the hypothetical argument) fails. Thus, we have good reason to doubt the soundness of the all-encompassing statement, “creations of a perfect being must also be perfect,” and we require additional support for the first premise of the Argument from Imperfection (A perfect creator can't create anything less than a perfect world) as to why a perfect creator cannot create an overall imperfect world, despite there being plausible reasons that a perfect being may have in creating imperfect beings.

Premise B)

Premise B posits that “The world is imperfect.” I won’t spend too much time evaluating this premise, since I have far less problems accepting it than I do accepting premise A (of which I am very skeptical). Indeed, given my prior arguments it actually appears that premise B is true, given that our world is undeniably inhabited with imperfect beings who inflict all sorts of moral evils on other creatures and the very world itself. Some theists have trouble with the very notion of a “perfect world,” (Catholic apologist Trent Horn likened the term to the incoherent notion of a “highest number”), but I won’t go too far down that road, since I’m not even convinced myself that the notion of a “perfect world” is inherently incoherent. Some theists also retreat into skepticism, positing that we don’t have enough knowledge to know whether the world is imperfect, or that there exist gratuitous moral evils. I will also remain agnostic on such positions. Indeed, this response is quite unsatisfying to the agnostic observer and doesn’t pose too much of a direct challenge to the atheist who is convinced through intuitive or probabilistic means. Instead, I will admit that premise B doesn’t seem too implausible to me at first blush. Certainly, the possibility of the world being imperfect doesn’t seem so crazy to me, though if I were to take up the argument I would appeal to pre-human and natural evils to avoid appeals to free will. 

In fact, I find the argument from evolutionary suffering (as very convincingly implemented by Ben in his debate against Fr. Gregory Pine). I think such arguments from natural evils (and especially moral critiques of the evolutionary process) are quite difficult to respond to. But perhaps that’s a response for another time.

        To reiterate my response to the Argument from Imperfection, I have put the intuitive soundness of the first premise to question, arguing for the plausibility of a perfect being’s ability to create imperfect beings, and have implied that we need further justification for the first premise if we want to accept the conclusion. In addition, I have gone over some brief objections to the second premise but have not explicitly agreed with any such objections. Further books could be written on that one premise alone, and I haven’t done enough research to confidently take a position on the premise. Maybe I will take it on in the future.